Corroboration
Corroboration as a rule of law is now a largely defunct aspect of the law of evidence (many of the old rules having been abolished by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 section 32 (1)) but it is one of those terms which many people have heard of and are not entirely sure what it means. Whilst it sounds a somewhat arcane word and potentially difficult to understand, corroboration was all about confirmation or support for certain types of evidence. What it was about was setting out a series of circumstances in which certain charges or evidence from certain persons required confirmation from another source, and identifying what that confirmation and source should be.
The idea was that in some circumstances to convict someone purely on the basis of one piece of evidence would be wrong. Of course such rules developed in an age when the punishments for criminal defendants were significantly more serious. One can perhaps understand against that background the reluctance to convict purely on the basis of certain types of evidence.
Some examples of the inability to convict on one piece of evidence still remain. Under the Perjury Act 1911 section 13 convictions cannot occur purely based upon "the evidence of one witness as to the falsity of any statement alleged to be false". Similarly the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 section 89 prevents speeding convictions based purely on the opinion evidence of one witness that the prosecuted person was driving the vehicle at a speed exceeding the speed limit. (This is purely opinion evidence. Obviously it does not apply to the evidence of one person who is using a properly approved and calibrated device to measure speed. It is only to apply to a person who merely sees a car driving and expresses the view that it is driving above the speed limit.
There were cases in which corroboration was required for certain types of witness. For example a child giving unsworn evidence (not on oath) had to be corroborated for a conviction. Corroboration meant evidence which was independent of the witness who had to be corroborated and which confirmed that witness’s evidence in a material way There were three other categories of witness where corroboration was not required for a conviction, but the judge had to warn the jury to view the evidence of their witness with caution and recommend that they looked for corroboration. The witnesses thought to be particularly suspect were with complainants in sex cases, accomplices (ie people who had helped the accused to carry out the crime) or children giving sworn testimony.
Although the technical rules regarding corroboration have gone, warnings are still frequently given. It is up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to deliver warnings. As was pointed out in the case of Makanjuola (1995 1 WLR 1348) "whether, as a matter of discretion, a judge should give any warning and if so its strength and terms must depend upon the content and manner of the witness’s evidence, the circumstances of the case and the issues raised.". In other words the judge has to apply common sense to the circumstances. It is normally a matter for the judge as to how he exercises his discretion. It is only where it is plain and obvious that a warning should have been given and was not given the Court of Appeal would interfere.
Therefore in most circumstances strict corroboration rules have gone. However the judge is expected to apply flexibly the question of whether and if so what warning should be given regarding the evidence against the accused.