The DNA Dispossessed
It is probably just as well (and not just on cultural taste grounds) that the Carry On series of films has come to an end. Otherwise inevitably there would have to be a further film, set in a government agency, entitled "Carry on Losing Private Data". Only having regard to the widespread news coverage about the various losses of sensitive data relating to huge numbers of people would the film have any chance of not being dismissed as relying on an utterly preposterous plot.
Were there a Queen's Award for services to identity fraud loss of private data on such a vast scale would almost certainly qualify for it. The fact that losses have occurred on more than one occasion shows two things. The first is the difficulty of ensuring that information entrusted to government agencies is not mislaid or lost. The second is the difficulty of knowing exactly when or how or on what scale losses have occurred. Once a pattern of losses emerges, it is possible that there may be others. The time lag between potential loss and disclosure is the perfect opportunity to the fraudster to squeeze as much as possible out of the data before the unsuspecting victims have any reason to suppose that they might have been targeted. In boxing you are always taught that it is the punch that you do not see coming it really hurts you. The same applies in many other aspects of life, including fraud.
Of course it would be wrong to assume (although it has provided the most spectacular examples) that it is only government agencies that are capable of losing banks of data. Other institutions holding it are capable of loss as well. However it is the State which is capable of introducing coercive powers for obtaining data, and which is capable of putting together a full suite of data from various sources. State loss is intrinsically more worrying and potentially more damaging.
This exacerbates the concern about the provision of data for identity cards and keeping such data secure and confidential. There are already considerable concerns that those who manage to obtain identity card details will have the "holy grail" of identity theft fraud. That concern is the greater when, apart from the efforts of sophisticated fraudsters, there is the possibility that careless loss could lead to virtually anyone having open access to the underlying data. That would potentially be the mother of all identity thefts.
The problem about including biometric or DNA data is that it cannot ever be changed. If your National Insurance number is stolen, or a password, or a bank account number, these can all be changed. Your DNA cannot. Therefore if that is mislaid or stolen you will be faced with the consequences lifelong. Even if no misuse occurs, never knowing when it might. If misuse does occur, never knowing when it will recur. Your DNA is a part of yourself and yet insofar as it is necessary as part of identity checks if lost or misapplied (making no allowance for the moment for deliberate corruption, even though however trustworthy public servants are as a whole there will always inevitably be bad apples) once you have lost it, it would be lost forever. The constant fear of fraud, and consequently a constant undermining of the position of the people affected. They would in effect be the DNA dispossessed. This is not a remote prospect, but all too likely. Remote or not it is a cogent reason why identity cards should not be contemplated, certainly not including such detail.