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Majority verdict

Those who have been following the Los Angeles Phil Spector trial will know that a mistrial has now been declared. That was because the jury could not agree on a unanimous verdict. Apparently the jury was split 10 in favour of a guilty verdict, 2 against. The charge against him was the murder of Lana Clarkson, aged 40. She was found shot dead at his Alhambra mansion, dying only a matter of hours after they met (for the first time) at the House of Blues nightclub, where she had a job as a hostess.

The position would have been very different in England. Now a majority of at least 10 jurors would suffice for a conviction. Therefore there would have been sufficient jurors in favour of a conviction to actually convict. (Although in the Phil Spector case that would have certainly have caused legal argument on appeal. The jury had originally been split 7:5, and the judge gave further direction which some commentators described as virtually inviting a conviction, suggesting that should a conviction have occurred there would have been strong grounds for appeal. All of that is now mere speculation).

That is not to say that juries are not encouraged here to strive for a unanimous verdict. That is what they are specifically instructed to do. It is only after a sufficient lapse of time that a jury will be given what is known as a "majority direction" specifying that a verdict of 10 will suffice. That of course can be "either way" so that 10 will suffice to acquit as well as to convict.

When considering whether majority verdicts are fair, is important to bear in mind that they can lead to acquittals when otherwise since the jury could not agree there might be a retrial. (If the jury have not reached a verdict then there can be a further trial).

As against that, there can also be disquiet about majority decisions. For example if someone is convicted of crime by a 10:2 majority, that means that two jurors were not satisfied of guilt. There is no death penalty in this country, but if there were, one could imagine that great disquiet would be felt by people not in principle opposed to the death penalty (obviously it would be felt anyway by those who were) at the thought that someone could be executed in respect of whom two jurors were not convinced of their guilt. Presumably in that situation the Home Secretary or other responsible cabinet minister would have to intervene to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment. As it happens that is a purely hypothetical point.

Our law obviously decided to move to majority verdicts and many would claim them to be a success. It certainly can deal with a situation where one or maybe two jurors are taking an outlandish view of the position. (It of course also avoids a mistrial where one juror has been bribed or threatened, which might be a factor in jurisdictions which have a substantial problem in regard). As against that, the other view is that if the jury is not unanimous they should not deliver a verdict, and a retrial should iron out any problems caused by one juror taking an idiosyncratic or idiotic view of the evidence.

Michael J. Booth QC